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Abstract  
The United States, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation & Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all authorize 
losing bidders to protest public procurements. The dual goal is to reduce government fraud 
and errors and increase competition. The hypothesis is that bid protests serve as a 
decentralized mechanism to increase government accountability and encourage vendor 
participation. An extensive legal and regulatory literature has emerged that supports the 
benefits of protest systems, but it is surprisingly silent about the costs. The goal of this 
economic study is to examine costs as well as benefits of bid protests. The static, probabilistic, 
micro-economic, partial equilibrium, representative bidder model developed in this paper 
offers a cautionary tale for government agencies, countries, and international institutions that 
rely on bid protests to improve public procurement outcomes. Protest systems appear to be 
an example of a well-intentioned government policy that has significant unintended 
consequences. This study reveals multiple potential deficiencies of protest systems and 
suggests alternative approaches to improve public procurement outcomes. 
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Introduction 
The United States, the United Nations (UN), the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) all 
authorize losing bidders to protest public procurements.1 (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2008; UNCITRAL, 2014; OECD, 2016; WTO, 2012, etc.). Military acquisition offers an 
important illustration. (see Arena, et. al., 2018).  
Two key claims appear in the legal literature in support of bid protests.2 First, that protests 
play an important role as a decentralized oversight mechanism to ensure “fairness” of the 
public procurement process. The claim is that allowing vendors to protest procurements 
reduces the risk of “crony capitalism” and helps deter favoritism, fraud, and errors. The 
U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) explains:  
“Fundamentally, bid protest systems, like audit systems, serve a procurement 
oversight function. They provide a means of monitoring the activities of 
government procurement officials, enforcing compliance with procurement laws 
and regulations, and correcting incidents of improper government action”           
(Carpenter & Schwartz, 2018, p. 10).   
The second claim is that allowing “disappointed bidders”3 to protest makes vendors 
more willing to compete delivering benefits of competitive markets that improve 
performance, costs, and schedules (Arrowsmith, Linarelli, & Wallace, 2000). The CRS 
claims: 
                                                          
1 Whereas the most common term, and the term used in this study, is bid protest, the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) refers to reviews, while the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement 
on Government Procurement uses the term challenges (see Gordon, 2006). 
2 According to the U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), a protest is defined as “a written objection by an 
interested party to any of the following: (1) A solicitation … by an agency … for a contract for the procurement of 
property or services, (2) The cancellation of the solicitation … (3) An award … of the contract [emphasis added], or 
(4) A termination or cancellation of an award of the contract” (FAR 33.101; see also U.S.C. 31 § 3551[1]). The 
majority of protests involve “an award … of the contract,” and that is the focus of this paper. 
3 Terms besides disappointed bidder in the literature include disappointed offeror, unsuccessful offeror, excluded 
offeror, and interested party. For the purposes of this study, these terms are used interchangeably and refer to a 
company that has standing or is allowed to protest the solicitation or award of a contract. “Interested 
party…means an actual or prospective offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of a 
government contract” (FAR 33.101). 
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“The bid protest system … can help promote fairness and transparency in the 
procurement process, which arguably encourages participation and increases 
competition for federal procurement awards. This, in turn, has the potential to 
improve the quality and reduce the costs of goods and services purchased by the 
government” (Carpenter & Schwartz 2018, p. 10).4 
Experience from major defense acquisitions raises questions about both claims—
that protests deter favoritism, and that they increase competition. In fact, a survey of the 
U.S. defense sector suggests that “increasingly, protests are being filed for business 
reasons rather than to correct mistakes or errors” (Hawkins, Yoder, & Gravier, 2016, p. 
153).  
According to the Congressional Research Service (CRS), since 2008, the annual 
rate of protests of government procurements has increased nearly 50% (Schwartz & 
Manuel, 2015). In 2014 alone, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) received over 
2,500 protests.5 Although bid protests are relatively rare in low-cost procurements, vendor 
selection decisions in major (high-dollar) defense purchases in the United States appear 
to be routinely and strategically protested. A recent study finds “the number of protesters 
and protest actions tends to grow with a contract’s value” (Arena et al., 2018, p. xvi). As 
former head of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Dan Gordon, observed,  
It is … true that very high-dollar procurements are much more likely to be 
protested: the higher the dollar value, the greater the likelihood of a protest. …For 
a company that loses the competition … with all the bid and proposal costs 
[“bidding costs”], the additional cost of filing a protest [“filing costs”] may seem 
minimal, so that filing a protest can be very tempting. (quoted in Clark, 2013) 
                                                          
4 “Enforcing compliance with procurement laws implicates not just high standards of integrity, but also…the 
maximization of competition” (Troff, 2005, pp. 118–120). 
5 A key pillar of the U.S. Federal Government’s protest process, the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA; 1984) 
claims bid protests improve procurement outcomes by reducing risk of fraud and errors and increasing 
competition. The CICA gives the Government Accountability Office (GAO) authority over bid protests as a less 
expensive alternative to judicial proceedings. Congress directed “to the maximum extent practicable, the 
Comptroller General [at the GAO] shall provide for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of protests” (31 
U.S.C. § 3554(a)). Since the majority of protests are filed with the GAO, that is the primary focus of this study. 
(Note: From FY2003–2007, nearly 7,000 cases were filed with the GAO, and only 328 with the Court of Federal 
Claims; see Schaengold, Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 255). 
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The model introduced in this paper focuses on a representative bidder competing 
for a government contract. The bidder is assumed to be a strategic, profit-maximizing firm 
responsible to shareholders. Under this assumption, it is demonstrated that well-
intentioned protest systems can inadvertently motivate inefficient (and potentially 
fraudulent) behavior on the part of bidders and public procurement officials and may or 
may not increase competition. Some preliminary observations serve to motivate the 
model. 
A. Do Protests Minimize Fraud and Errors?  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports, “Many … acquisition 
professionals are concerned that bid protests can delay contract awards…costing millions 
of dollars…preventing government from getting the goods and services it needs when it 
needs them” (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 8). The term “fedmail” is applied when 
strategic bidders use the threat of protests to extract concessions from well-intentioned 
procurement officials unwilling to risk shortages of critical equipment, services, or 
supplies. A survey by the American Bar Association found “half of all federal agencies 
had settled protests to simply move forward with the procurement. … POs [procurement 
officials] often settle by enhancing the terms of other contracts that the protester currently 
has with the procuring agency” (Marshall et al., 1991, p. 300).6  
“Buyoff” settlements occur when risk-averse procurement officials preemptively 
offer concessions to bidders to ensure protest-proof procurements and avoid delays in 
acquiring critical equipment, services, and supplies.7 Acting Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics John Young stated, “Protests are extremely 
detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer. These protest actions consume vast 
amounts of time of acquisition, legal, and requirements team members; [and] delay 
program initiation and the delivery of capability” (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 8). 
                                                          
6 For example, according to CNBC: “Lockheed Martin is getting offered a multiyear block buy for its F-35 aircraft in 
exchange for not objecting to its rival Boeing getting new orders from the Navy for the F/A-18 fighter...” (Daniels, 
2017)  
 
7 Arguing that “the tail is wagging the dog,” a survey by Hawkins et al. (2016) finds that “fear of protest increases 
compromised technical evaluations, added procurement lead time, and transaction costs, while it decreases 
contracting officer authority and is associated with source selection method inappropriateness” (p. 152). 
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Especially troublesome in the event of hidden fedmail and buyoff settlements by 
procurement agencies is a measure of successful protests routinely reported by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). The so-called “effectiveness rate” attempts to 
capture “the percentage of protesters obtaining relief—either through a protest being 
sustained, or through voluntary action [emphasis added] taken by the agency” 
(Kepplinger, 2008). The CRS is on record stating “the effectiveness rate may be a good 
way to measure the number of protests that have actual or potential merit” (Schwartz & 
Manuel, 2009, p. 5).  
At first glance, a greater effectiveness rate might appear to reinforce the dual goals 
of a protest system. But this clearly is not the case if so-called “voluntary actions” involve 
inefficient and potentially fraudulent fedmail or buyoff settlements. In that case, an inflated 
“effectiveness rate” could inadvertently reflect government agencies over-generously 
engaged in fedmail or buyoff settlements with taxpayer dollars to keep procurements on 
schedule, minimize delays, or simply avoid negative publicity. This also contradicts a CRS 
claim that the “effectiveness rate” reflects protests that have merit.  
The risk of fedmail and buyoff settlements warrants serious rethinking by the GAO, 
the CRS, and others tempted to use the “effectiveness rate” to guide policy decisions. 
Government departments, agencies, and Congress should be cautioned against any 
analysis or recommendations that utilize this measure. 
If Fedmail and Buyoff settlements are a widespread problem, then allowing bid 
protests may inadvertently increase fraud and errors. Note that multiple less risky and 
potentially lower cost alternatives exist to ensure fairness in the public procurement 
process: inspector generals, random audits, alternative dispute resolution, integrity pacts, 
electronic auctions, etc.8 
  
                                                          
8 According to Camm, et. al. (2012): “During 2000–2008, the Air Force experienced 836 protests—about 93 a year. 
It offered corrective action that offerors accepted in 273, or 33 percent, of these. It ultimately suffered sustained 
protests in only 29, or 3 percent, of these…[O]n average, we believe…costs to the Air Force of an observed 
sustained protest probably exceed those of an observed early corrective action. Nonetheless, because early 
corrective action is so much more common, both impose significant costs.” (pp. ix-x) 
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B. Do Protests Increase Competition? 
A guiding principle of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA; 1984) and of the 
U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is to promote competition for government 
contracts. The implicit assumption woven throughout these documents, and in the legal 
and regulatory literature, is that the “second chance” offered by bid protests to address 
possible fraud or errors in the procurement process makes prospective losing bidder 
types more inclined to participate (thereby increasing competition). Typical is the 
following: “The absence of a protest system might undermine public confidence that 
contract award decisions are based on merit and in compliance with the law, which could 
discourage participation by qualified and reputable parties [“losing bidder types”] and 
result in wasteful government spending” (Carpenter & Schwartz, 2018, p. 10). 
But this ignores prospective winning bidder types. The risk they face is that a 
winning bid will be delayed and disputed. This increases transaction costs, which lowers 
the expected value of winning a government contract (see Hawkins et al., 2016). On the 
margin, this makes prospective winning bidder types less inclined to participate (thereby 
reducing competition).  
This yields a counterintuitive result. Copying the private sector which has no formal 
protest system, and ensuring fairness of the process in lower cost ways could actually 
increase competition (if reducing the risk of disputes motivates more winning bidder types 
to participate, than losing bidder types drop out). In sharp contrast to the standard 
assumption in the existing literature, it is an empirical question whether or not protest 
systems increase competition.  
Unfortunately, even if (on net) a bid protest system succeeds in attracting more 
vendors, insights from “transaction cost economics” remind us ex-ante competition often 
leads to ex-post monopoly (Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1999). The risk is that a winning 
“foot-in-the-door” bidding strategy results in a “hold-up,” where a winning bidder more 
than covers its losses from high prices later charged for change orders (see Melese, et. 
al., 2007). So even if bid protest systems succeed in attracting more vendors ex-ante this 
does not guarantee better ex-post procurement outcomes.  
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Similarly, regardless of how slight the probability a protest will be sustained, a 
losing incumbent on a re-competed contract may have strong strategic incentives to 
protest to artificially extend their contract. There is concern “[automatic] stays triggered 
by GAO protests [can] encourage contractors to ‘game the system’ … [where] contractors 
knowingly file … protests with GAO in order to harass their competitors and delay 
awards…or in the hopes of obtaining short-term contracts … during the pendency of the 
GAO protest” (Manuel & Schwartz, 2016).9 Hawkins, et. al. find “[s]ometimes protests are 
filed by incumbents to delay a switch in contractors, thereby gaining a few more months 
of revenue” (2016, p. 155).  
To achieve desirable competitive market outcomes, instead of bid protests, the 
“contestable markets” literature urges lowering entry barriers as a more cost-effective 
strategy (see Baumol, Panzar, & Willig, 1982). For example, by reducing military 
specifications; complexity (e.g., optimal “bundling”); excessive rules and regulations; 
unique government accounting/reporting and other regulatory requirements; the degree 
of asset specificity; or the ability of incumbents to raise entry barriers through strategic 
bid protests.  
C. What Interventions and Alternatives Exist to Achieve the Goals of a 
Protest System? 
If profit-maximizing strategic bidders can undermine government’s goals for a bid 
protest system, then it pays to investigate ways to modify bidder behavior, and to explore 
alternatives (i.e., more cost-effective governance mechanisms).10 The risks posed by 
significant transaction costs and unintended consequences from bid protests should 
encourage public officials to review costs and benefits of protest systems and evaluate 
alternatives. The model developed in this paper offers a starting point. 
The comparative statics results of the model reveal how several key government 
decision variables could impact a profit-maximizing representative bidder. Recognizing 
                                                          
9 “Federal statutes and regulations…[require] GAO to…[resolve] protests within 65 to 100 days after they are filed.” 
(Manuel & Schwartz, 2016)  
10 “Congress has passed several provisions intended to address concerns with the bid protest process, which 
largely have been focused on increasing Congress’s understanding of how legislative amendments to bid protest 
procedures could enhance the efficiency of the procurement process, discourage unwarranted protests, and 
generally improve procurement outcomes for the federal government” (Carpenter & Schwartz, 2018, p. 11). 
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costs as well as benefits of a protest system, this study invites a review of alternative 
portfolios of governance mechanisms to improve procurement outcomes that could 
substitute for bid protests (e.g., internal audits, external audits, independent 
investigations, alternative dispute resolution, integrity pacts, and other incentive 
mechanisms). Results of the model also suggest there may be significant returns from 
reducing regulatory (and product) complexity, and making critical investments in the 
education, training, motivation (incentive alignment), and retention of experienced public 
procurement officials. The model suggests this could have the added bonus of lowering 
bid prices, thereby reducing government procurement costs. 
If it is established that the burden of protests outweighs the benefits, and it is 
politically infeasible to abandon protest systems, then reducing the rate of protests is 
appropriate, and can be accomplished in two ways: by reducing expected benefits of a 
protest to a “disappointed bidder” (including enabling a protester to achieve desired 
outcomes through other means), or by increasing expected costs. Options include 
narrowing standing (eligibility), setting stricter time limits for filing and deciding protests, 
encouraging alternative dispute resolution (ADR), raising filing fees, setting fines for 
frivolous protests, instituting new rules or reputation assessments to restrict frequent or 
repeated protestors, or having losers pay, as is done in the UK (see Appendix 1).11  
A major concern expressed in the legal and regulatory literature is that limiting 
protests will inhibit competition and result in higher costs.12 However, the literature is 
mostly silent regarding the strategic behavior of bidders and procurement officials. It also 
ignores the potential benefits of more timely delivery of projects, products and services, 
and lower transaction costs, and potentially lower prices, from fewer protests. Finally, the 
legal and regulatory literature mostly neglects how the growing burden and complexity of 
regulations to address past procurement problems complicates the task of procurement 
                                                          
11 “The FY2018 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established a three-year pilot program, to begin in 
December 2019, to assess and issue a report on ‘the effectiveness of requiring [certain] contractors to reimburse 
the Department of Defense for costs incurred in processing covered protests’ that are denied by GAO” (Carpenter 
& Schwartz, 2018, p. 11). 
12 “Attempts to disincentivize protests … may have, on balance, the unintended consequence of harming the 
federal procurement system by discouraging participation in federal contracting and, in turn, limiting competition” 
(Kepplinger, 2009b, p. 12). 
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officials. The more complex the regulatory environment, the more likely errors are made 
in the procurement process, raising the probability of bid protests, and the probability 
those protests are sustained, which in turn increases risks of fedmail and buyoff 
settlements.13  
The next section leverages these observations to develop a probabilistic, micro-
economic, partial equilibrium, representative bidder model. The following section 
summarizes and interprets results of the model. The concluding section offers policy 
recommendations and some avenues for future research. 
  
                                                          
13 In fact, Wong & Gerras (2015) conclude U.S. Army officers became comfortable lying about complying with 
regulations, partly as a result of the challenge of compliance with conflicting regulations.  
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The Model 
The literature generally focuses on two players: a disappointed bidder and the 
government. In the United States, the “government” consists of several distinct players. 
Disappointed bidders have the option to challenge any of three key players: government 
procurement officials (POs) and their agency (department or activity); the quasi-judicial 
Government Accountability Office (GAO); and/or the Court of Federal Claims (COFC). 
For simplicity, we restrict our representative bidder to a single protest (e.g., either with the 
agency, the GAO, or the COFC).14 
Other key stakeholders are often overlooked in the protest literature. Besides a 
“disappointed bidder,” it is critical to consider other bidders (especially the “winning 
bidder,” eager to defend the award), those that ultimately depend on procurement 
outcomes (e.g., our troops and/or citizens), and taxpayers who foot the bill.15 The goal of 
this paper is to represent the best interests of the last two players, in the case of military 
contracts, troops, and taxpayers. This section develops a probabilistic, micro-economic, 
partial equilibrium representative bidder model to help identify opportunities to enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of government procurements, in order to obtain the 
greatest (troop) value for (taxpayer) money. 
Assuming a representative bidder’s goal is to maximize expected profits, the 
objective function for any bidder/offeror entering a competition for a government contract 
consists of three scenarios (or “states of nature”): (1) the expected returns from winning 
the competition, E(W); (2) the expected returns from winning a protest given they lose the 
                                                          
14 Note GAO issues preliminary and final decisions on protests. Again, for simplicity, the model assumes a single 
decision is taken by the Agency, GAO, or COFC. 
15 Gordon (2006) focuses on four principal parties: the disappointed offeror who is denied a contract award or the 
potential offeror who is excluded from competition, the acquiring agency, the public at large and their elected 
representatives, and an intervening offeror or successful awardee.   Each has a different objective in resolving the 
protest. The unsuccessful offeror seeks a forum to air complaints, to learn as much information as possible about 
the denial or exclusion of their offer, and, ultimately, to obtain some type of meaningful relief.  The acquiring 
agency seeks to resolve the protest in a way that minimizes the impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
acquisition process.  The public seeks a resolution that promotes the integrity, transparency, and accountability of 
the acquisition system. The successful awardee (or intervening offeror) seeks a resolution that supports the 
original award (Gordon, 2006, p. 4). 
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competition (i.e., the protest is “sustained”) is given by E(W/L); and (3) the expected 
returns from losing the competition and losing the protest (i.e., the protest is not sustained) 
is given by E(L/L).  
Our representative bidder’s problem is illustrated in Figure 1. The probability the 
bidder wins the competition is Pw and the probability a protest is sustained is Ps.16 
Expected payoffs at the end of each branch [E(W); E(W/L); E(L/L)] are explained in detail 
below. 
 
Figure 1.  Representative Bidder Decision Problem 
The two key decision variables controlled by our representative bidder are the bid 
price, P≥0, for the contracted quantity, Q≥0; and the investment, I≥0, to sustain a protest 
in the event the bidder loses the competition. The bidder’s problem is to select an optimal 
                                                          
16 Note the sum of the probabilities of the three possible states of nature (winning the competition E(W); losing 
but winning the protest E(W/L); losing and losing the protest E(L/L)) are mutually exclusive and collectively 
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combination of bid price and protest investment (P*, I*) to maximize overall expected 
profits: 
Max V(P,I) = E(W) + E(W/L) + E(L/L).    (1) 
The first term, the expected return from winning the competition, is given by 
E(W) = PW(X0 – CB).       (2) 
Profits from a winning bid are X0 = PQ – C(Q,R), where C(Q,R) is the winning 
bidder’s cost function, and R represents regulatory complexity, such that δC/δQ>0, and 
δC/δR>0 (i.e., a more complex and burdensome regulatory environment raises 
production costs).  
To allow the possibility other bidders might protest a winning bid, we introduce the 
possibility of “split buys” (see Coughlan & Gates, 2012). The contracted quantity is 
therefore given by Q=Q(I0), where I0≥0 represents cumulative protest investments of other 
losing bidders, such that δQ/δI0<0 (i.e., the greater cumulative protest investment, the 
smaller the quantity allocated to a winning bidder). 
To simplify the model, bid and proposal costs, CB, act as a proxy for quality of the 
project, product, or service, and capture any other non-price variables of interest to the 
government. We assume these costs are directly related to the measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) of the bidder’s proposal (i.e., not including price).  
Therefore, higher bid and proposal costs, CB, incurred by our bidder (ceteris 
paribus), increase the probability they win the competition, given by PW=PW(P,N,CB), such 
that δPW/δCB>0, and δ2PW/(δCB)2<0. Conversely, the higher the price bid, P, and the more 
bidders, N≥2, the lower the probability of winning, such that δPW/δN<0 and δPW/δP<0,17 
where δ2PW/(δP)2<0, δ2PW/δPδN≤0, and δ2Pw/δPδCB≥0.18   
                                                          
17 We further assume the absolute value of the elasticity of the probability of winning the competition with respect 
to the bid price is less than one (i.e., the elasticity is the %reduction in Pw for a given %increase in P, or 
|(δPw/δP)(P/Pw)|<1). 
18 The greater the number of bidders, N, then for any given bid price, P, the lower the probability of winning, PW. 
Conversely, the greater a representative bidder’s investment in the quality of their proposal reflected in bid and 
proposal costs, CB, then for any given bid, P, the greater the probability of winning, PW. 
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The second term in Equation 1 represents expected returns from losing the 
competition, but winning the protest (i.e., the protest is “sustained”): 
E(W/L)= (1-PW)PS[X1-CF-I-CB],     (3) 
where (1-PW) is the probability of losing the competition; CF are exogenous government-
set filing fees, and for simplicity, X1≤X0 is the award or “prize” in the event the protest is 
sustained.  
The probability a protest is sustained is given by, Ps=Ps(P,I,N,T,I0,R,CB). The 
higher the bid price, P>0, the lower the probability a protest is sustained, such that 
δPs/δP<0; where δ2Ps/(δP)2<0.19 However, the greater the representative bidder’s 
investment in the protest process, I>0, the greater likelihood a protest is sustained, such 
that δPs/δI>0, where δ2Ps/(δI)2<0, such that bidder protest investments increase the 
probability a protest will be sustained, but at a decreasing rate, and δ2Ps/δPδI≤0 (i.e., the 
larger the protest investment, the smaller the impact of a high bid price on the probability 
the protest is sustained). Also, for any given protest investment, the greater the quality of 
the proposal (reflected in higher bid and proposal costs, CB), the greater the probability 
the protest is sustained, or δ2PS/δIδCB>0. 
The proxy variable, T, represents training/education/experience of government 
procurement officials. The greater T, the lower the risk of errors in the acquisition process, 
and the better communication, documentation, contract specifications, quality of 
debriefings, etc. Thus the greater T, the less likely a protest will be sustained, or 
δPs/δT<0, where δ2Ps/δIδT<0, and δ2Ps/δPδT≤0.  
The reverse is true for regulatory complexity, R. The more complex and 
burdensome the regulatory environment, not only does this increase production costs, 
but it leads to a greater risk of missteps and errors by procurement officials, which 
                                                          
19 Note that it is likely the percentage difference in price relative to the low price bid, (P-PL)/PL, is more likely to 
influence the probability a bid is sustained, than the absolute price bid, P. This can be accommodated by 
constraining the functional form of the relationship given by δPs/δP<0, and δ2Ps/(δ𝑃)2<0, so that the Price is 
bounded between the low price bid, PL (where Ps=1), and PMax=(1+X%)PL (where Ps=0) (i.e., where X reflects how 
far the price in percentage terms can reasonably be above the low bid before there is no chance a protest will be 
sustained). In this case, the comparative static results will be the same if we use either the bid price or the 
percentage difference between the bid price and the low bid. 
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increases the probability a protest is sustained, or δPs/δR>0, where δ2Ps/δIδR>0 and 
δ2Ps/δPδR≥0. 
Since bid and proposal costs are a proxy for quality, the greater CB, the greater 
the probability a protest is sustained, δPs/δCB>0, where δ2Ps/(δCB)2<0, δ2Ps/δPδCB≥0, 
and δ2Ps/δIδCB≥0 such that the greater a representative bidder’s investment in their 
proposal, CB, then for any given bid, P, or protest investment, I, the greater the probability 
a protest is sustained, Ps.  
Data reported in Maser & Thompson (2010) suggests increasing the number of 
bidders (ceteris paribus) increases the probability a protest is sustained, δPs/δN>0. 
However, the sign on δ2Ps/δIδN is an empirical question: positive (negative) depending 
if more bidders increases (decreases) the likelihood a representative bidder’s protest is 
sustained, for any given protest investment.  
Finally, it is also an empirical question whether greater cumulative protest 
investments by other bidders, Io, raise or lower the probability a given bidder’s protest is 
sustained (i.e., δPs/δIo=?). It is also unclear if greater cumulative protest investment 
makes it more or less likely an individual bidder’s protest will be sustained for any given 
bid price (i.e., δ2Ps/δPδIo=?), and more or less likely any individual bidder’s protest is 
sustained for a given protest investment (i.e., δ2Ps/δIδIo=?).  
The final term in our representative bidder’s profit Equation 1, is the expected 
return from losing the competition, and losing the protest: 
E(L/L)= (1-PW)(1-PS)[X2+X3-CF-I-CB]      (4) 
where the variable, X2<Xo represents the bidder’s “opportunity cost,” or value of the next 
best alternative project available if they lose the competition, or decide not to participate 
(see Figure 1). If a representative bidder’s protest is denied, then the variable, X3, can 
represent two possibilities: X3>0 represents compensation that might be offered a losing 
bidder (i.e., possibly reflecting “fedmail” or “buyoffs,” or perhaps valuable information 
obtained from a more extensive government debrief about competitors winning strategy), 
while X3<0 represents a penalty for losing the protest (e.g., “loser pays”).  
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Maximizing the representative bidder’s expected profits (given by (1), (2), (3), and 
(4)) to solve the optimal bid price and protest investment (P*,I*), yields the following First 
Order Necessary Conditions for an Optimum:  
V1=δV/δP= PwQ + (δPw/δP)[Xo-(X2+X3)-CF-I]       
    +(X1-X2-X3)[(1-Pw)(δPs/δP)–Ps(δPW/δP)] = 0  (5) 
and 
V2=δV/δI = (1-Pw)[(δPs/δI)(X1-X2-X3)-1] = 0.     (6) 
Conditions required to ensure the Second Order Sufficient Conditions are satisfied at the 
optimum (or that, V11V22-𝑉12
2 >0), include: δ2Ps/(δI)2<0; δ2Ps/(δP)2≤0; X1>(X2+X3); and 
Xo>[(PsX1+(1-Ps)(X2+X3))-CF-I]. 
From the Implicit Function Theorem, the first order necessary, and second order 
sufficient, conditions for a maximum yield a set of comparative statics results for the two 
decision variables: the optimal bid price, P*, and protest investment, I*. Applying the 
Envelope Theorem20 further reveals the impact of changes in the exogenous variables on 
a representative bidder’s expected profits, V*. A summary of the results appears in Table 
1. 
TABLE I: Comparative Statics Results 
 X1 X2 X3>0 (X3<0) N Io  CB CF T (R) 
P* +? + + (-) -? -? + - - (+) 
I* + - - (+) -? - + 0 - (+) 
V* + + + (-) ? - ? - - (?) 
Note: “?” indicates: given certain conditions. 
 
  
                                                          
20 From the Envelope Theorem (Silberberg, 1978, pp. 168–171), taking partial derivatives of the objective function 
with respect to any parameter, k, yields the change in the overall value function at the optimum, V*, with respect 
to a change in k. Detailed calculations are available upon request. 
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Results 
To interpret the results in Table 1, we work our way from left to right across the top 
row and discuss each model parameter in turn. The bigger the expected “prize” from a 
protest, X1, the greater the optimal bid price, P*. When a protest offers a bigger 
prize/award, it is optimal to increase the bid price, taking a greater risk of losing the 
competition, because of the greater expected value from the “second chance” provided 
by a bid protest. Not surprisingly, a bigger protest prize also justifies a bigger investment, 
I*, to increase chances of winning the protest. Naturally, a bigger protest prize also boosts 
overall expected profits at the optimum, V*. 
While a greater value of a representative bidder’s next best alternative project, X2, 
justifies a higher bid price for the government contract, P*, (i.e., there is a lower 
opportunity cost to losing the competition), it also reduces the incentive to invest in a 
protest, I*. Of course, an increase in the value of any alternative to the government 
contract, increases overall expected profits, V*.  
Now consider the possibility of “Fed Mail” or “Buy Offs” so that losing a protest still 
offers a consolation prize, X3>0. Then any increase in such benefits (presumably made 
by a government agency to reduce future disruptions from unhappy bidders), besides 
directly raising agency costs and indirectly other costs, involves a serious negative 
externality—an unintended consequence is higher optimal bid prices, P*, which increases 
overall government procurement costs. However, since a bigger consolation prize means 
the same expected value of a protest can now be achieved with a lower probability of 
winning the protest, this has the effect of lowering incentives to invest in bid protests, I*. 
Of course, a higher consolation prize increases overall expected profits, V*. 
Instead of receiving a consolation prize for losing a protest, now suppose penalties 
apply, or that X3<0. In this case, increasing penalties yields the opposite results: the 
optimal bid price, P*, will be lower to try to win the competition, since there is now greater 
risk in protesting. The greater risk of punishment from losing a protest also means it pays 
to invest more in winning the protest, I*. Finally, the added risk (expected cost) of a 
possible penalty reduces overall expected profits, V*. 
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The greater the number of bidders, N, the lower any individual competitor’s optimal 
bid price, P* (a public benefit of increased competition), and protest investment, I* (if 
δ2Ps/δIδN<0). It also lowers the expected overall profits of any individual bidder, V*.21  
Knowing there is an increase in protest expenditures by other bidders, I0, will 
reduce the optimal bid price of a representative bidder, P* (if the absolute value of 
elasticity of Pw with respect to P is less than one), and the representative bidder’s own 
protest investment, I*. It also reduces the bidder’s expected profits, V*.22 
An increase in filing fees for a protest, CF, lowers the optimal bid price, P*, but has 
no impact on protest investment, I*, since the fees are essentially “sunk costs.” Of course, 
higher filing fees will lower overall expected profits, V*.  
Conversely, since an increase in bid and proposal costs, CB, reflects an increase 
in the quality (MOE) of the proposal, this increases the optimal bid price, P*, and the 
optimal protest investment, I*.23 The impact on overall expected profits, V*, is 
indeterminate, that is, positive (negative) if benefits from increasing the probability of 
winning and sustaining a protest are bigger (smaller) than the higher investment costs of 
preparing the bid. 
Paradoxically, adding well-intentioned rules and regulations that inadvertently 
increase regulatory complexity, R, can have perverse effects. It raises optimal bid prices, 
P*, increasing the costs of public projects, products, and services. Increased regulatory 
complexity also contributes to higher bid protest investments, I*, increasing transaction 
costs and possibly triggering other unintended consequences. The impact on overall 
expected profits, V*, is negative (positive) if added expected production costs from 
regulation, Pw(δC/δR), are bigger (smaller) than the expected increase in profits from a 
                                                          
21 Condition for P* is satisfied if δ2Pw/δPδN=0 (or small enough). Condition for I* is satisfied if δ2Ps/δIδN<0. 
Condition for V* is satisfied if positive impact of N on Ps (δPs/δN>0) is small enough, and/or if the absolute value of 
the impact of N on Pw (δPw/δN<0) is big enough. Higher bid costs increase the probability of winning the 
competition, but the extra costs lower profits from winning, requiring a higher price to “break even.” 
22 Condition for P* holds if absolute value of impact of cumulative protest expenditures by other bidders, Io, on a 
representative bidder’s contract quantity (δQ/δIo<0) is small enough, or the probability the representative 
bidder’s protest is sustained (δPs/δIo<0) is big enough, and/or that (X1-X2-X3) is big enough. Condition for I* holds 
since δ2Ps/δIδIo<0.  
23 Condition on P* is satisfied if δ2Pw/δPδCB≥0, and δ2Ps/δPδCB≥0. Condition on I* is satisfied if δ2Pw/δIδCB>0. 
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protest, given the marginal increase in probability of winning a protest from greater errors, 
etc. resulting from increased regulatory complexity, (1-Pw)(δPs/δR)[X1-(X2+X3)].  
Finally, boosting government investments in education/training/experience of 
public procurement officials, T, has multiple payoffs. It lowers optimal bid prices, P*, 
cutting the costs of public projects, products, and services. It also reduces the optimal 
amount invested in bid protests, I*, lowering transaction costs and possibly limiting other 
unintended consequences. The impact of increasing the competency of procurement 
officials in reducing optimal bid prices, P*, and protest investments, I*, is reflected in lower 
overall expected profits for bidders, V*.24 
  
                                                          
24 Condition on P* is satisfied since δ2Ps/δPδT≤0. Condition on I* is satisfied since δ2Ps/δIδT<0. 
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Conclusion 
The goal of any public procurement system is to obtain “value for money.” To help 
achieve this goal, countries around the world have adopted bid protest systems. The legal 
and regulatory literature that underpins protest systems in the United States and other 
countries claims allowing disappointed bidders to protest public procurements reduces 
favoritism, fraud, and errors, and encourages competition. This study offers a cautionary 
tale for any government agency, country, or international organization that relies on, 
and/or promotes, bid protests to improve public procurement outcomes.  
As a first step to explore the costs and benefits of a protest system, a static, 
probabilistic, micro-economic, partial equilibrium, representative bidder model is 
developed. Bidders are assumed to be strategic, profit-maximizing firms responsible to 
shareholders. Under this assumption, it is demonstrated that well-intentioned protest 
systems can inadvertently motivate inefficient (and potentially fraudulent) behavior on the 
part of bidders and public procurement officials and may or may not increase competition.  
Risks from high transaction costs and other unintended consequences of bid 
protests should encourage public officials to critically review their systems and consider 
alternatives. If the burden of protests outweighs the benefits, then reducing protests is 
appropriate and can be accomplished in two ways: by reducing expected benefits of a 
protest (including enabling protesters to achieve desired outcomes through other means) 
or by increasing expected costs.  
The comparative statics results of the model reveal how several key government 
decision variables impact profit-maximizing bidders. The representative bidder controls 
their bid price, P*, and any investment to sustain a protest, I*. The government controls 
the variables: X1, X3, CF, T and R. Reducing the protest prize (X1) and unnecessary 
regulatory burdens (R), and increasing investments in human capital (T), all reduce 
expected benefits of a protest. Alternatively, governments can raise expected costs by 
increasing filing fees (CF) and/or introducing penalties for losing a protest (X3<0).  
Reducing the protest award (X1), can be accomplished by (i) unbundling the 
contract vertically, in terms of different stages of production, or horizontally, in terms of 
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quantities; (ii) sharing awards (split buys); or (iii) recording protests by firms, using this 
information in future competitions (i.e., using reputation to establish contract quantities).  
Constructive ways of reducing the probability of a successful protest include (i) 
investing in training and experience, (ii) initiatives to build integrity (e.g., codes of conduct, 
ethics training, etc.); (iii) aligning incentives for procurement officials to improve 
procurement outcomes, such as linking pay and promotions to successful procurement 
outcomes; (iv) ensuring transparency of assessment criteria; (v) ensuring transparency 
and accountability of the evaluation and selection process; (vi) making companies aware 
of the low probability of awards being overturned; and (vii) employing alternative 
strategies such as random (internal and external) audits and investigations, and 
encouraging alternative dispute resolution (ADR). An important avenue for future 
research is to investigate costs and benefits of alternative portfolios of governance 
mechanisms to improve procurement outcomes. This study offers a starting point. 
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Appendix 
Note that in the United States, restricting the number of protests may be 
unconstitutional on First and Fifth Amendment grounds. To limit the number of non-
frivolous protests would violate the First Amendment right to petition the government for 
the redress of grievances, and the Fifth Amendment right to due process. Federal courts 
tend not to favor broad limitations on access to the legal process. For example, the 
Supreme Court held in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board 
(461 U.S. 731 (1983)), that a Federal agency cannot halt lawsuits brought even for 
improper motives unless those lawsuits are based on “intentional falsehoods or on 
knowingly frivolous claims,” or otherwise lack a reasonable basis. In another case, 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (404 U.S. 508 (1972)), the Supreme 
Court held that Federal antitrust laws may penalize businesses bringing lawsuits and 
petitions to Federal agencies only if such petitions and lawsuits are “a mere sham to cover 
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with a business 
relationship of a competitor.” Federal appellate courts also identified two limited ways 
which can render a legal action frivolous:  
First, a legal action is considered “frivolous as filed” when a plaintiff or appellant 
grounds its case on arguments or issues “that are beyond the reasonable 
contemplation of fair-minded people, and no basis for [the party’s position] in law 
or fact can be or is even arguably shown.” … Second, a legal action is considered 
“frivolous as argued” when a plaintiff or appellant has not dealt fairly with the court, 
has significantly misrepresented the law or facts, or has abused the judicial 
process by repeatedly litigating the same issue in the same court. (GAO, 2009, p. 
11)   
However, options include agency policies requiring mandatory consideration of stay 
overrides, requiring vigorous objections, setting stricter time limits for deciding or 
resolving protests, mandating alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as the default 
resolution mechanism, or other approaches such as replicating sanctions for frivolous 
protests available at the Court of Federal Claims in GAO protests, or instituting rules such 
as the posting of bonds for the expenses of delays resulting from stays of protests that 
are ultimately not sustained. In addition, the standard of review at the GAO may be 
adjusted from the more relaxed and subjective “reasonableness” standard to the 
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“arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” 
standard used by the COFC under the Administrative Procedures Act (Choice of Forum 
for Federal Government Contracts Bid Protests, at 298 (2009). Further, agencies can be 
encouraged not to allow post-award bid protests challenging the evaluation and the 
conduct of source selection to result as a matter of course in pre-award corrective actions, 
such as total cancellation of solicitation and full re-competition. The Competition in 
Contracting Act (1984), Title 31 of the U.S. Code, Sections 3551–3556, is a key pillar of 
the U.S. protest process, together with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR Parts 5, 
10, 12–15, and 33), the Tucker Act (2010), Executive Order No. 12979 (1995), and 
various case law precedents. Note: These legal insights were edited by former NPS 
colleague, Max Kidalov, in Melese et al. (2010). 
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